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Book Tells About Mercenaries in Azerbaijan Fighting Against Karabakh

A first-ever study on the role of mercenaries and other foreign terrorist forces employed by Azerbaijan in Nagorno Karabkah war of 1992-1994 has been released, entitled "Mercenaries, extremists and Islamist fighters in Nagorno Karabakh war" (Yerevan, 2010).

The author is a well-known scholar - Dr. Hayk Demoyan, who is also serving as the director of Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute in Yerevan. Of course, the issue have been a subject to several op-ed pieces and newspaper articles, but hardly ever any efforts have been put together to examine the topic from scientific perspective. On this behalf, this is a must-read for those who study the history of first Karabakh war of early 1990s.

The book includes well-grounded facts that go far indeed in explaining how terrorist structures emerged and developed in the whole Caucasus region. As the author notes, "the struggle of Karabakh Armenians for self-determination and self-preservation [was] a fight not only against regular Azeri troops…. but also against … foreign mercenaries and extremists recruited by the Azerbaijani authorities."

The Part 1 examines the Turkish political, diplomatic and military support to Azerbaijan

In pre-1991 period Turkey saw itself as a stander-by at the outset of the clashes in Karabakh, as the developments had been perceived as being a domestic issue for still alive Soviet Union. However, since the anti-Armenian pogroms of Baku (1990) and establishment of Soviet troops in Azerbaijan, the factor of Turkic-solidarity became increasingly evident, and Turkey began to supply armaments, logistics and other military support to its newly-discovered ally. The Soviet leadership was quite critical about that, and the TASS agency reported on January 24 (1990) that Turkey should "refrain from sending military equipment" to the landlocked Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan. Partly by ignoring this, even before the official formation of Azeri Armed Forces, until early 1992, Turkey held two secret air flights to deliver arms supplies to its ally, which was already in the state of war – first internally in a fight against Karabakhi people, and then attacking the sovereign territories of newly independent Armenia. As a matter of cautious policy, Turkey provided the Azeris mainly with Soviet-made arms and weapons systems that the possessed in large amounts – in an effort not to show-off and anger their NATO allies. Together with this, a physical support from Turkey also played a key role on side of Azerbaijan, as since 1992 nearly 150 high-ranking Turkish Army officers, including 10 army generals (mostly retired) took part in military operations. In another instance – the neo-fascist Turkish organization of "Grey Wolves" (Bozkurtlar – in Turkish) enjoyed a legal status in Azerbaijan and encountered nearly 15.000 members, all of them involved in the army, police and paramilitary units.

Turkey also planned at least two times (1992 and 1993) an incursion into Armenian territory. Apart from the well-known remark by Russian general Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov in 1992, there is another story uncovered in the book. "According to information from French intelligence sources, which the US Ambassador in Armenia later confirmed, there was an agreement between the then speaker of the Russian Parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov and Turkeish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller that in case of the success of the anti-Yeltsin faction in Russia's parliamentary struggle, Khasbulatov would allow Turkey to execute small-scale incursions into Armenia" (pp. 16-17).

During the Karabakh War the territory of still unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was also used to recruit foreign mercenaries and military instructors. With the initiative and support of a British peer, Lord Erskine of Rerrick, and Turkish businessman Mustafa Mutlu – British and Turkish mercenaries and arms were to be sent to Azerbaijan. The latter was reported to be ready to pay 150mln pounds annually, mainly in the form of oil. The British peer later confirmed that a British registered company Summit (Consortium) Ltd. arranged the deal.

The role of mercenaries, extremist and terrorist forces in different conflicts is rather ambivalent – while the host-country either denies their presence or says they are "foreign supporters", the rest of the world declares them outlawed. The United Nations undertook numerous attempts to condemn the role of mercenaries in conflicts. Along with the Additional Protocols to Geneva Conventions (1977), in 1989, the United Nations General Assembly completed the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries. However, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, a number of other African states and those engaged in conflicts in Yugoslavia ignored the international law in force. A number of facts and examples are illustrated in the book to shed a light on the use of mercenaries in Chechen, Afghan and Karabakh conflicts.

Part 2 reads about the actual role of mercenaries at Karabakh war

The Islamist groups and extremists found a fertile ground, as the author claims, in Azerbaijan especially after Heydar Aliyev came into power in 1993, who started actively recruiting mercenaries from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Chechnya and elsewhere. The Chechen leadership, also in the pursuit of securing foreign allies, managed to establish good relations with Azeri president Abdulfaz Elcibey, cemented with reciprocal visits between Baku and Grozny of Elcibey and Chechen rebel general Johar Dudayev. At first, the Chechen leadership refused to openly engage in Karabakh conflict, however agreeing to provide volunteer corps with negotiated salaries, ranging between 600-1000 rubles per day. The first group of fighters arrived in Azerbaijan headed by well-known terrorist Shamil Basayev, who was shortly after refuted by Karabakh forces. In early June 1992 the total amount of Chechen mercenaries in the conflict totaled 300 fighters.

Further on Dr.Demoyan argues that Afghan mujahedeen were the first foreign forces employed in the territories of former Soviet Union – ranging from Tajik civil war and Karabakh war. "Hattab, a Jordanian Arab of Chechen origin who was not so well known at that time, was amongst the first to arrive in Nagorno Karabakh to fight against the Karabakh Armenians. According to the figures uncovered in the book, around 1500-2000 mujahedeen forces were fighting in Karabakh war, around three hundred of them involved in regular military actions on a permanent basis. Still, the Azeri side, which had even hired interpreters for their better involvement, was unsatisfied since the mujahedeen soon became too far demanding. In the words of Lt-Col. D.Lyatifov, "it seem[ed] that they came here to receive treatment rather than to fight" (p. 32).

Perhaps most outstanding claim that is brought forward by the author is the one proving the connection of "Azeri and other Islamist radical-extremist organizations operating in Azerbaijan were in direct contact with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda from the 1990s onwards" (pp. 36-37). Even before the 9/11 attach, the American media had touched upon a possible "Azerbaijani connection" to the terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998. Just after those attacks, as the author mentions, the FBI was able to trace around 60 calls made by a satellite phone used by bin Laden to communicate with associates in Baku and through them with partners residing in Africa.

Summing up this ground-breaking study, the author arrives at a conclusion that the political elite of Azerbaijan repeatedly tried to employ the factor of ethnic and religious solidarity for the purposes of gaining external support, in particular from Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Chechnya. The recruitment of foreign mercenaries and terrorists to fight in Karabakh on the Azeri side "was constant and extensive", despite the applicable international law prohibiting the use of mercenaries.

Yet, this is first ever scientific examination of the issue, which is to be continued and enriched with further contributions to better understanding of the Karabakh conflict, especially at times when a second round of the war is being extensively propagated nowadays.

Written by Hovhannes Nikoghosyan. He a Research Fellow at Yerevan-based Public Policy Institute (hn@professionals.am)

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