NASA Columbia Report on Shuttle Disaster: Equipment "Did Not Work Well"

The hope is that the conclusions of the NASA Columbia report will enable the agency to make survivability improvements in any future containment capsules, space suits, helmets, and other emergency equipment.

While noting that at least one crew member was furiously pushing buttons for 30 seconds after the initial alarm, the NASA Columbia report indicatest that seat restraints, pressure suits and helmets of didn't work well, leading to "lethal trauma.

First, because pressure suits were added after the Challenger disaster in 1986, they were not fully integrated with the shuttle systems, meaning astronauts could not close their visors during re-entry, or else oxygen would build up in the cabin, a fire hazard.

Even if worn, and one astronaut was not wearing his helmet, they were too large, inadequately protecting their heads. Additionally, their seat belts did not automatically retract to hold them in their seats when violent movements occurred.

The new report said the accident clearly was "not survivable" under any circumstance. But it identified "lessons to be learned about how to improve crew survival in the future."

The report was unable to ascertain which of the previously posited theories, lack of oxygen during depressurization or impact trauma as the spacecraft spun violently, killed the seven astronauts.

All seven crew members -- commander Rick Husband, pilot William McCool, Michael Anderson, David Brown, Kalpana Chawla, Laurel Clark, and Ilan Ramon -- died in the shuttle crash.

Watch rare disaster footage from an Apache helicopter attached to this story.